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Abstract
A possibly immortal agent tries to maximise its summed discounted re-
wards over time, where discounting is used to avoid infinite utilities and en-
courage the agent to value current rewards more than future ones. Some
commonly used discount functions lead to time-inconsistent behavior where
the agent changes its plan over time. These inconsistencies can lead to very
poor behavior. We generalise the usual discounted utility model to one where
the discount function changes with the age of the agent. We then give a sim-
ple characterisation of time-(in)consistent discount functions and show the
existence of a rational policy for an agent that knows its discount function is
time-inconsistent.
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1 Introduction
The goal of an agent is to maximise its expected utility; but how do we measure
utility? One method is to assign an instantaneous reward to particular events, such
as having a good meal, or a pleasant walk. It would be natural to measure the
utility of a plan (policy) by simply summing the expected instantaneous rewards,
but for immortal agents this may lead to infinite utility and also assumes rewards
are equally valuable irrespective of the time at which they are received.
One solution, the discounted utility (DU) model introduced by Samuelson in
[Sam37], is to take a weighted sum of the rewards with earlier rewards usually
valued more than later ones.
There have been a number of criticisms of the DU model, which we will not
discuss. For an excellent summary, see [FOO02]. Despite the criticisms, the DU
model is widely used in both economics and computer science.
A discount function is time-inconsistent if plans chosen to maximise expected
discounted utility change over time. For example, many people express a preference
for $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30 days, but reverse that preference 30 days later
when given a choice between $110 tomorrow or $100 today [GFM94]. This behavior
can be caused by a rational agent with a time-inconsistent discount function.
Unfortunately, time-inconsistent discount functions can lead to extremely bad
behavior and so it becomes important to ask what discount functions are time-
inconsistent.
Previous work has focussed on a continuous model where agents can take actions
at any time in a continuous time-space. We consider a discrete model where agents
act in finite time-steps. In general this is not a limitation since any continuous
environment can be approximated arbitrarily well by a discrete one. The discrete
setting has the advantage of easier analysis, which allows us to consider a very
general setup where environments are arbitrary finite or infinite Markov decision
processes.
Traditionally, the DU model has assumed a sliding discount function. Formally,
a sequence of instantaneous utilities (rewards) R = (rk, rk+1, rk+2, · · · ) starting at
time k, is given utility equal to
∑∞
t=k dt−krt where d ∈ [0, 1]
∞. We generalise this
model as in [Hut06] by allowing the discount function to depend on the age of the
agent. The new utility is given by
∑∞
t=k d
k
t rt. This generalisation is consistent with
how some agents tend to behave; for example, humans becoming temporally less
myopic as they grow older.
Strotz [Str55] showed that the only time-consistent sliding discount function
is geometric discounting. We extend this result to a full characterisation of time-
consistent discount functions where the discount function is permitted to change over
time. We also show that discounting functions that are “nearly” time-consistent give
rise to low regret in the anticipated future changes of the policy over time.
Another important question is what policy should be adopted by an agent that
knows it is time-inconsistent. For example, if it knows it will become temporarily
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myopic in the near future then it may benefit from paying a price to pre-commit
to following a particular policy. A number of authors have examined this question
in special continuous cases, including [Gol80, PY73, Pol68, Str55]. We modify their
results to our general, but discrete, setting using game theory.
The paper is structured as follows. First the required notation is introduced
(Section 2). Example discount functions and the consequences of time-inconsistent
discount functions are then presented (Section 3). We next state and prove the
main theorems, the complete classification of discount functions and the continuity
result (Section 4). The game theoretic view of what an agent should do if it knows
its discount function is changing is analyzed (Section 5). Finally we offer some
discussion and concluding remarks (Section 6).
2 Notation and Problem Setup
The general reinforcement learning (RL) setup involves an agent interacting sequen-
tially with an environment where in each time-step t the agent chooses some action
at ∈ A, whereupon it receives a reward rt ∈ R ⊆ R and observation ot ∈ O.
The environment can be formally defined as a probability distribution µ where
µ(rtot|a1r1o1a2r2o2 · · · at−1rt−1ot−1at) is the probability of receiving reward rt and
observation ot having taken action at after history h<t := a1r1o1 · · · at−1rt−1ot−1.
For convenience, we assume that for a given history h<t and action at, that rt is
fixed (not stochastic). We denote the set of all finite histories H := (A×R×O)∗
and write h1:t to be a history of length t, h<t to be a history of length t − 1. ak,
rk, and ok are the kth action/reward/observation tuple of history h and will be
used without explicitly redefining them (there will always be only one history “in
context”).
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A deterministic environment (where every value of
µ(·) is either 1 or 0) can be represented as a graph with
edges for actions, rewards of each action attached to the
corresponding edge, and observations in the nodes. For
example, the deterministic environment on the right rep-
resents an environment where either pizza or pasta must
be chosen at each time-step (evening). An action leading to an upper node is eat
pizza while the ones leading to a lower node are eat pasta. The rewards are for a
consumer who prefers pizza to pasta, but dislikes having the same food twice in a
row. The starting node is marked as S. This example, along with all those for the
remainder of this paper, does not require observations.
The following assumption is required for clean results, but may be relaxed if an
ǫ of slop is permitted in some results.
Assumption 1. We assume that A and O are finite and that R = [0, 1].
Definition 2 (Policy). A policy is a mapping π : H → A giving an action for each
history.
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Given policy π and history h1:t and s ≤ t then the probability of reaching history
h1:t when starting from history h<s is P (hs:t|h<s, π) which is defined by,
P (hs:t|h<s, π) :=
t∏
k=s
µ(rkok|h<kπ(h<k)). (1)
If s = 1 then we abbreviate and write P (h1:t|π) := P (h1:t|h<1, π).
Definition 3 (Expected Rewards). When applying policy π starting from history
h<t, the expected sequence of rewards R
π(h<t) ∈ [0, 1]
∞, is defined by
Rπ(h<t)k :=
∑
ht:k
P (ht:k|h<t, π)rk.
If k < t then Rπ(h<t)k := 0.
Note while the set of all possible ht:k ∈ (A×R×O)
k−t+1 is uncountable due to
the reward term, we sum only over the possible rewards which are determined by
the action and previous history, and so this is actually a finite sum.
Definition 4 (Discount Vector). A discount vector dk ∈ [0, 1]∞ is a vector[
dk1, d
k
2, d
k
3, · · ·
]
satisfying dkt > 0 for at least one t ≥ k.
The apparently superfluous superscript k will be useful later when we allow the
discount vector to change with time. We do not insist that the discount vector be
summable,
∑∞
t=k d
k
t <∞.
Definition 5 (Expected Values). The expected discounted reward (or utility or
value) when using policy π starting in history h<t and discount vector d
k is
V π
d
k(h<t) := R
π(h<t) · d
k :=
∞∑
i=1
Rπ(h<t)id
k
i =
∞∑
i=t
Rπ(h<t)id
k
i .
The sum can be taken to start from t since Rπ(h<t)i = 0 for i < t. This means
that the value of dkt for t < k is unimportant, and never will be for any result
in this paper. As the scalar product is linear, a scaling of a discount vector has
no affect on the ordering of the policies. Formally, if V π1
d
k (h<t) ≥ V
π2
d
k (h<t) then
V π1
αdk
(h<t) ≥ V
π2
αdk
(h<t) for all α > 0.
Definition 6 (Optimal Policy/Value). In general, our agent will try to choose a
policy π∗
d
k to maximise V
π
d
k(h<t). This is defined as follows.
π∗
d
k(h<t) := argmax
π
V π
d
k(h<t), R
∗
d
k(h<t) := R
π∗
dk (h<t),
V ∗
d
k(h<t) := V
π∗
dk
d
k (h<t).
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If multiple policies are optimal then π∗
d
k is chosen using some arbitrary rule.
Unfortunately, π∗
d
k need not exist without one further assumption.
Assumption 7. For all π and k ≥ 1, limt→∞
∑
h<t
P (h<t|π)V
π
d
k(h<t) = 0.
Assumption 7 appears somewhat arbitrary. We consider:
1. For summable dk the assumption is true for all environments. With the ex-
ception of hyperbolic discounting, all frequently used discount vectors are
summable.
2. For non-summable discount vectors dk the assumption implies a restriction
on the possible environments. In particular, they must return asymptotically
lower rewards in expectation. This restriction is necessary to guarantee the
existence of the value function.
From now on, including in theorem statements, we only consider environ-
ments/discount vectors satisfying Assumptions 1 and 7. The following theorem
then guarantees the existence of π∗
d
k .
Theorem 8 (Existence of Optimal Policy). π∗
d
k exists for any environment and
discount vector dk satisfying Assumptions 1 and 7.
The proof of the existence theorem is in the appendix.
An agent can use a different discount vector dk for each time k. This motivates
the following definition.
Definition 9 (Discount Matrix). A discount matrix d is a ∞ × ∞ matrix with
discount vector dk for the kth column.
It is important that we distinguish between a discount matrix d (written bold),
a discount vector dk (bold and italics), and a particular value in a discount vector
dkt (just italics).
Definition 10 (Sliding Discount Matrix). A discount matrix d is sliding if dkk+t =
d1t+1 for all k, t ≥ 1.
Definition 11 (Mixed Policy). The mixed policy is the policy where at each time
step t, the agent acts according to the possibly different policy π∗
d
t .
πd(h<t) := π
∗
d
t(h<t) Rd(h<t) := R
πd(h<t).
We do not denote the mixed policy by π∗
d
as it is arguably not optimal as dis-
cussed in Section 5. While non-unique optimal policies π∗
d
k at least result in equal
discounted utilities, this is not the case for πd. All theorems are proved with respect
to any choice πd.
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Definition 12 (Time Consistency). A discount matrix d is time consistent if and
only if for all environments π∗
d
k(h<t) = π
∗
d
j(h<t), for all h<t where t ≥ k, j.
This means that a time-consistent agent taking action π∗
d
t(h<t) at each time t
will not change its plans. On the other hand, a time-inconsistent agent may at time
1 intend to take action a should it reach history h<t (π
∗
d
0(h<t) = a). However upon
reaching h<t, it need not be true that π
∗
d
t(h<t) = a.
3 Examples
In this section we review a number of common discount matrices and give an example
where a time-inconsistent discount matrix causes very bad behavior.
Constant Horizon. Constant horizon discounting is where the agent only cares
about the future up to H time-steps away, defined by dkt = [[t − k < H ]].
1 Shortly
we will see that the constant horizon discount matrix can lead to very bad behavior
in some environments.
Fixed Lifetime. Fixed lifetime discounting is where an agent knows it will not care
about any rewards past time-step m, defined by dkt = [[t < m]]. Unlike the constant
horizon method, a fixed lifetime discount matrix is time-consistent. Unfortunately it
requires you to know the lifetime of the agent beforehand and also makes asymptotic
analysis impossible.
Hyperbolic. dkt = 1/(1 + κ(t − k)). The parameter κ determines how farsighted
the agent is with smaller values leading to more farsighted agents. Hyperbolic
discounting is often used in economics with some experimental studies explaining
human time-inconsistent behavior by suggesting that we discount hyperbolically
[Tha81]. The hyperbolic discount matrix is not summable, so may be replaced by
the following (similar to [Hut04]), which has similar properties for β close to 1.
dkt = 1/(1 + κ(t− k))
β with β > 1.
Geometric. dkt = γ
t with γ ∈ (0, 1). Geometric discounting is the most commonly
used discount matrix. Philosophically it can be justified by assuming an agent will
die (and not care about the future after death) with probability 1− γ at each time-
step. Another justification for geometric discount is its analytic simplicity - it is
summable and leads to time-consistent policies. It also models fixed interest rates.
No Discounting. dkt = 1, for all k, t. [LH07] and [Leg08] point out that dis-
counting future rewards via an explicit discount matrix is unnecessary since the
environment can capture both temporal preferences for early (or late) consumption,
as well as the risk associated with delaying consumption. Of course, this “discount
matrix” is not summable, but can be made to work by insisting that all environ-
ments satisfy Assumption 7. This approach is elegant in the sense that it eliminates
1[[expr]] = 1 if expr is true and 0 otherwise.
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the need for a discount matrix, essentially admitting far more complex preferences
regarding inter-temporal rewards than a discount matrix allows. On the other hand,
a discount matrix gives the “controller” an explicit way to adjust the myopia of the
agent.
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inconsistent discount matrices we consider the poli-
cies of several agents acting in the following environ-
ment. Let agent A use a constant horizon discount
matrix with H = 2 and agent B a geometric discount
matrix with some discount rate γ.
In the first time-step agent A prefers to move right with the intention of moving
up in the second time-step for a reward of 2/3. However, once in second time-step,
it will change its plan by moving right again. This continues indefinitely, so agent
A will always delay moving up and receives zero reward forever.
Agent B acts very differently. Let πt be the policy in which the agent moves right
until time-step t, then up and right indefinitely. V πt
d
k (h<1) = γ
t (t+1)
(t+2)
. This value does
not depend on k and so the agent will move right until t = argmax
{
γt (t+1)
t+2
}
<∞
when it will move up and receive a reward.
The actions of agent A are an example of the worst possible behavior arising
from time-inconsistent discounting. Nevertheless, agents with a constant horizon
discount matrix are used in all kinds of problems. In particular, agents in zero sum
games where fixed depth mini-max searches are common. In practise, serious time-
inconsistent behavior for game-playing agents seems rare, presumably because most
strategic games don’t have a reward structure similar to the example above.
4 Theorems
The main theorem of this paper is a complete characterisation of time consistent
discount matrices.
Theorem 13 (Characterisation). Let d be a discount matrix, then the following are
equivalent.
1. d is time-consistent (Definition 12)
2. For each k there exists an αk ∈ R such that d
k
t = αkd
1
t for all t ≥ k ∈ N.
Recall that a discount matrix is sliding if dkt = d
1
t−k+1. Theorem 13 can be used
to show that if a sliding discount matrix is used as in [Str55] then the only time-
consistent discount matrix is geometric. Let d be a time-consistent sliding discount
matrix. By Theorem 13 and the definition of sliding, α1d
1
t+1 = d
2
t+1 = d
1
t . Therefore
1
α1
d12 = d
1
1 and d
1
3 =
1
α1
d12 =
(
1
α1
)2
d11 and similarly, d
1
t =
(
1
α1
)t−1
d11 ∝ γ
t with
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γ = 1/α1, which is geometric discounting. This is the analogue to the results of
[Str55] converted to our setting.
The theorem can also be used to construct time-consistent discount rates. Let
d
1 be a discount vector, then the discount matrix defined by dkt := d
1
t for all t ≥ k
will always be time-consistent, for example, the fixed lifetime discount matrix with
dkt = 1 if t ≤ H for some horizon H . Indeed, all time-consistent discount rates can
be constructed in this way (up to scaling).
Proof of Theorem 13. 2 =⇒ 1: This direction follows easily from linearity of the
scalar product.
π∗
d
k(h<t) ≡ argmax
π
V π
d
k(h<t) ≡ argmax
π
R
π(h<t) · d
k = argmax
π
R
π(h<t) · αkd
1
(2)
= argmax
π
αkR
π(h<t) · d
1 = argmax
π
R
π(h<t) · d
1 ≡ π∗
d
1(h<t)
as required. The last equality of (2) follows from the assumption that dkt = αkd
1
t for
all t ≥ k and because Rπ(h<t)i = 0 for all i < t.
1 =⇒ 2: Let d0 and dk be the discount vectors used at times 0 and k respectively.
Now let k ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · and consider the deterministic environment below where
the agent has a choice between earning reward r1 at time t1 or r2 at time t2. In this
environment there are only two policies, π1 and π2, where R
π1(h<k) = r1et1 and
R
π2(h<k) = r2et2 with ei the infinite vector with all components zero except the
ith, which is 1.
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Since d is time-consistent, for all r1, r2 ∈ R and k ∈ N we have:
argmax
π
V π
d
1(h<k) ≡ argmax
π
R
π(h<k) · d
1 (3)
= argmax
π
R
π(h<k) · d
k ≡ argmax
π
V π
d
k(h<k). (4)
Now V π1
d
k ≥ V
π2
d
k if and only if d
k · [Rπ1(h<k)−R
π2(h<k)] = [d
k
t1 , d
k
t2] · [r1,−r2] ≥ 0.
Therefore we have that,
[d1t1 , d
1
t2 ] · [r1,−r2] ≥ 0⇔ [d
k
t1 , d
k
t2] · [r1,−r2] ≥ 0. (5)
Letting cos θk be the cosine of the angle between [d
k
t1
, dkt2 ] and [r1,−r2] then Equation
(5) becomes cos θ0 ≥ 0 ⇔ cos θk ≥ 0. Choosing [r1,−r2] ∝ [d
1
t2 ,−d
1
t1 ] implies that
cos θ0 = 0 and so cos θk = 0. Therefore there exists αk ∈ R such that
[dkt1 , d
k
t2] = αk[d
1
t1 , d
1
t2 ]. (6)
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Let k ≤ t1 < t2 < t3 < · · · be a sequence for which d
1
ti
> 0. By the previous
argument we have that, [dkti, d
k
ti+1
] = αk[d
1
ti
, d1ti+1 ] and [d
k
ti+1
, dkti+2] = α˜k[d
1
ti+1
, d1ti+2].
Therefore αk = α˜k, and by induction, d
k
ti
= αkd
1
ti
for all i. Now if t ≥ k and d1t = 0
then dkt = 0 by equation (6). By symmetry, d
k
t = 0 =⇒ d
1
t = 0. Therefore
dkt = αkd
1
t for all t ≥ k as required.
In Section 3 we saw an example where time-inconsistency led to very bad be-
havior. The discount matrix causing this was very time-inconsistent. Is it possible
that an agent using a “nearly” time-consistent discount matrix can exhibit similar
bad behavior? For example, could rounding errors when using a geometric discount
matrix seriously affect the agent’s behavior? The following Theorem shows that this
is not possible. First we require a measure of the cost of time-inconsistent behavior.
The regret experienced by the agent at time zero from following policy πd rather
than π∗
d
1 is V ∗
d
1(h<1)− V
πd
d
1 (h<1). We also need a distance measure on the space of
discount vectors.
Definition 14 (Distance Measure). Let dk,dj be discount vectors then define a
distance measure D by
D(dk,dj) :=
∞∑
i=max{k,j}
|dki − d
j
i |.
Note that this is almost the taxicab metric, but the sum is restricted to i ≥
max {k, j}.
Theorem 15 (Continuity). Suppose ǫ ≥ 0 and Dk,j := D(d
k,dj) then
V ∗
d
1(h<1)− V
πd
d
1 (h<1) ≤ ǫ+D1,t +
t−1∑
k=1
Dk,k+1
with t = min
{
t :
∑
h<t
P (h<t|π
∗
d
1)V ∗
d
1(h<t) ≤ ǫ
}
, which for ǫ > 0 is guaranteed to
exist by Assumption 7.
Theorem 15 implies that the regret of the agent at time zero in its future time-
inconsistent actions is bounded by the sum of the differences between the discount
vectors used at different times. If these differences are small then the regret is also
small. For example, it implies that small perturbations (such as rounding errors) in
a time-consistent discount matrix lead to minimal bad behavior.
The proof is omitted due to limitations in space. It relies on proving the result
for finite horizon environments and showing that this extends to the infinite case by
using the horizon, t, after which the actions of the agent are no longer important.
The bound in Theorem 15 is tight in the following sense.
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Theorem 16. For δ > 0 and t ∈ N and any sufficiently small ǫ > 0 there exists an
environment and discount matrix such that
(t− 2)(1− ǫ)δ < V ∗
d
1(h<1)− V
πd
d
1 (h<1) < (t+ 1)δ
≡ D1,t +
t−1∑
i=1
Di,i+1
where t = min
{
t :
∑
h<t
P (h<t|π
∗
d
1)V ∗
d
1(h<t) = 0
}
< ∞ and where D(dk,dj) ≡
Dk,j = δ for all k, j.
Note that t in the statement above is the same as that in the statement of
Theorem 15. Theorem 16 shows that there exists a discount matrix, environment
and ǫ > 0 where the regret due to time-inconsistency is nearly equal to the bound
given by Theorem 15.
Proof of Theorem 16. Define d by
dki =
{
δ if k < i < t
0 otherwise
Observe that D(dk,dj) = δ for all k < j < t since dji = d
k
i for all i except i = j.
Now consider the environment below.
S · · ·
0 0 0
1− ǫ 1− ǫ2 1− ǫt−1
1− ǫ
1− ǫ2
0
For sufficiently small ǫ, the agent at time zero will plan to move right and then down
leading to R∗
d
1(h<1) = [0, 1− ǫ, 1− ǫ, · · · ] and V
∗
d
1(h<1) = (t− 1)δ(1− ǫ).
To compute Rd note that d
k
k = 0 for all k. Therefore the agent in time-step
k doesn’t care about the next instantaneous reward, so prefers to move right with
the intention of moving down in the next time-step when the rewards are slightly
better. This leads to Rd(h<1) = [0, 0, · · · , 1− ǫ
t−1, 0, 0, · · · ]. Therefore,
V ∗
d
1(h<1)− V
πd
d
1 (h<1) = (t− 1)δ(1− ǫ)− (1− ǫ
t−1)δ ≥ (t− 2)δ(1− ǫ)
as required.
5 Game Theoretic Approach
What should an agent do if it knows it is time inconsistent? One option is to treat
its future selves as “opponents” in an extensive game. The game has one player per
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time-step who chooses the action for that time-step only. At the end of the game
the agent will have received a reward sequence r ∈ R∞. The utility given to the kth
player is then r ·dk. So each player in this game wishes to maximise the discounted
reward with respect to a different discounting vector.
S
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For example, let d1 = [2, 1, 2, 0, 0, · · · ] and d2 =
[∗, 3, 1, 0, 0, · · · ] and consider the environment on the right. Ini-
tially, the agent has two choices. It can either move down to
guarantee a reward sequence of r = [4, 0, 0, · · · ] which has util-
ity of d1 · [4, 0, 0, · · · ] = 8 or it can move right in which case it
will receive a reward sequence of either r′ = [1, 3, 0, 0, · · · ] with
utility 5 or r′′ = [1, 1, 3, 0, 0, · · · ] with utility 9. Which of these
two reward sequences it receives is determined by the action taken in the second
time-step. However this action is chosen to maximise utility with respect to discount
sequence d2 and d2 · r′ > d1 · r′′. This means that if at time 1 the agent chooses to
move right, the final reward sequence will be [1, 3, 0, 0, · · · ] and the final utility with
respect to d1 will be 5. Therefore the rational thing to do in time-step 1 is to move
down immediately for a utility of 8.
The technique above is known as backwards induction which is used to find
sub-game perfect equilibria in finite extensive games. A variant of Kuhn’s theorem
proves that backwards induction can be used to find such equilibria in finite extensive
games [OR94]. For arbitrary extensive games (possibly infinite) a sub-game perfect
equilibrium need not exist, but we prove a theorem for our particular class of infinite
games.
A sub-game perfect equilibrium policy is one the players could agree to play, and
subsequently have no incentive to renege on their agreement during play. It isn’t
always philosophically clear that a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy should be
played. For a deeper discussion, including a number of good examples, see [OR94].
Definition 17 (Sub-game Perfect Equilibria). A policy π∗
d
is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium policy if and only if for each t V
π∗
d
d
t (h<t) ≥ V
π˜
d
t(h<t), for all h<t, where
π˜ is any policy satisfying π˜(h<i) = π
∗
d
(h<i)∀h<i where i 6= t.
Theorem 18 (Existence of Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium Policy). For all environ-
ments and discount matrices d satisfying Assumptions 1 and 7 there exists at least
one sub-game perfect equilibrium policy π∗
d
.
Many results in the literature of game theory almost prove this theorem. Our
setting is more difficult than most because we have countably many players (one
for each time-step) and exogenous uncertainty. Fortunately, it is made easier by the
very particular conditions on the preferences of players for rewards that occur late
in the game (Assumption 7). The closest related work appears to be that of Drew
Fudenberg in [Fud83], but our proof (see appendix) is very different. The proof idea
is to consider a sequence of environments identical to the original environment but
with an increasing bounded horizon after which reward is zero. By Kuhn’s Theorem
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[OR94] a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy must exist in each of these finite games.
However the space of policies is compact (Lemma 23) and so this sequence of sub-
game perfect equilibrium policies contains a convergent sub-sequence converging to
policy π. It is not then hard to show that π is a sub-game prefect equilibrium policy
in the original environment.
Proof of Theorem 18. Add an action adeath to A and µ such that if adeath is taken
at any time in h<t then µ returns zero reward. Essentially, once in the agent takes
action adeath, the agent receives zero reward forever. Now if π∗
d
is a sub-game per-
fect equilibrium policy in this modified environment then it is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium policy in the original one.
For each t ∈ N choose πt to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy in the
further modified environment obtained by setting ri = 0 if i > t. That is, the
environment which gives zero reward always after time t. We can assume without
loss of generality that πt(h<k) = a
death for all k ≥ t. Since Π is compact, the
sequence π1, π2, · · · has a convergent subsequence πt1 , πt2 , · · · converging to π and
satisfying
1. πti(h<k) = π(h<k), for all h<k where k ≤ i.
2. πti is a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy in the modified environment with
reward rk = 0 if k > ti.
3. πti(h<ti) = adeath.
We write V˜ πti for the value function in the modified environment. It is now shown
that π is a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy in the original environment. Fix a
t ∈ N and let π˜ be a policy with π˜(h<k) = π(h<k) for all h<k where k 6= t. Now
define policies π˜ti by
π˜ti(h<k) =
{
π˜(h<k) if k ≤ i
πti(h<k) otherwise
By point 1 above, π˜ti(h<k) = πti(h<k) for all h<k where k 6= t. Now for all i > t we
have
V π
d
t(h<t) ≥ V
πti
d
t (h<t)− |V
π
d
t(h<t)− V
πti
d
t (h<t)| (7)
≥ V˜
πti
d
t (h<t)− |V
π
d
t(h<t)− V
πti
d
t (h<t)| (8)
≥ V˜
π˜ti
d
t (h<t)− |V
π
d
t(h<t)− V
πti
d
t (h<t)| (9)
≥ V π˜
d
t(h<t)− |V
π
d
t(h<t)− V
πti
d
t (h<t)|
− |V
π˜ti
d
t (h<t)− V˜
π˜ti
d
t (h<t)| − |V
π˜ti
d
t (h<t)− V
π˜
d
t(h<t)| (10)
where (7) follows from arithmetic. (8) since V ≥ V˜ . (9) since πti
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy. (10) by arithmetic. We now
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show that the absolute value terms in (10) converge to zero. Since V π(·)
is continuous in π and limi→∞ πti = π and limi→∞ π˜ti = π˜, we obtain
limi→∞
[
|V π
d
t(h<t)− V
πti
d
t (h<t)|+ |V
π˜ti
d
t (h<t)− V
π˜
d
t(h<t)|
]
= 0. Now π˜ti(h<k) = a
death
if k ≥ ti, so |V
π˜ti (h<t) − V˜
π˜ti (h<t)| = 0. Therefore taking the limit as i goes to
infinity in (10) shows that V π
d
t(h<t) ≥ V
π˜
d
t(h<t) as required.
In general, π∗
d
need not be unique, and different sub-game equilibrium policies can
lead to different utilities. This is a normal, but unfortunate, problem with the sub-
game equilibrium solution concept. The policy is unique if for all players the value
of any two arbitrary policies is different. Also, if ∀k(V π1
d
k = V
π2
d
k =⇒ ∀jV
π1
d
j = V
π2
d
j )
is true then the non-unique sub-game equilibrium policies have the same values
for all agents. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is necessarily satisfied in
our setup. The problem of how players might choose a sub-game perfect equilibrium
policy appears surprisingly understudied. We feel it provides another reason to avoid
the situation altogether by using time-consistent discount matrices. The following
example illustrates the problem of non-unique sub-game equilibrium policies.
Example 19. Consider the example in Section 3 with an agent using a constant
horizon discount matrix with H = 2. There are exactly two sub-game perfect
equilibrium policies, π1 and π2 defined by,
π1(h<t) =
{
up if t is odd
right otherwise
π2(h<t) =
{
up if t is even
right otherwise
Note that the reward sequences (and values) generated by π1 and π2 are different
with Rπ1(h<1) = [1/2, 0, 0, · · · ] and R
π2(h<1) = [0, 2/3, 0, 0, · · · ]. If the players
choose to play a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy then the first player can choose
between π1 and π2 since they have the first move. In that case it would be best to
follow π2 by moving right as it has a greater return for the agent at time 0 than π1.
For time-consistent discount matrices we have the following proposition.
Proposition 20. If d is time-consistent then V ∗
d
k = V
πd
d
k = V
π∗
d
d
k for all k and choices
of π∗
d
k and πd and π
∗
d
.
Is it possible that backwards induction is simply expected discounted reward
maximisation in another form? The following theorem shows this is not the case
and that sub-game perfect equilibrium policies are a rich and interesting class worthy
of further study in this (and more general) settings.
Theorem 21. ∃d such that π∗
d
6= π∗
d˜
0 , for all d˜
0
.
The result is proven using a simple counter-example. The idea is to construct
a stochastic environment where the first action leads the agent to one of two sub-
environments, each with probability half. These environments are identical to the
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example at the start of this section, but one of them has the reward 1 (rather than
3) for the history right, down. It is then easily shown that π∗
d
is not the result of
an expectimax expression because it behaves differently in each sub-environment,
while any expectimax search (irrespective of discounting) will behave the same in
each.
6 Discussion
Summary. Theorem 13 gives a characterisation of time-(in)consistent discount
matrices and shows that all time-consistent discount matrices follow the simple
form of dkt = d
1
t . Theorem 15 shows that using a discount matrix that is nearly
time-consistent produces mixed policies with low regret. This is useful for a few
reasons, including showing that small perturbations, such as rounding errors, in
a discount matrix cannot cause major time-inconsistency problems. It also shows
that “cutting off” time-consistent discount matrices after some fixed depth - which
makes the agent potentially time-inconsistent - doesn’t affect the policies too much,
provided the depth is large enough. When a discount matrix is very time-inconsistent
then taking a game theoretic approach may dramatically decrease the regret in the
change of policy over time.
Some comments on the policies π∗
d
k (policy maximising expected d
k-discounted
reward), πd (mixed policy using π
∗
d
k at each time-step t) and π
∗
d
(sub-game perfect
equilibrium policy).
1. A time-consistent agent should play policy π∗
d
k = πd for any k. In this case,
every optimal policy π∗
d
k is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium policy.
2. πd will be played by an agent that believes it is time-consistent, but may not
be. This can lead to very bad behavior as shown in Section 3.
3. An agent may play π∗
d
if it knows it is time-inconsistent, and also knows
exactly how (I.e, it knows dk for all k at every time-step). This policy is
arguably rational, but comes with its own problems, especially non-uniqueness
as discussed.
Assumptions. We made a number of assumptions about which we make some brief
comments.
1. Assumption 1, which states that A and O are finite, guarantees the existence
of an optimal policy. Removing the assumption would force us to use ǫ-optimal
policies, which shouldn’t be a problem for the theorems to go through with an
additive ǫ slop term in some cases.
2. Assumption 7 only affects non-summable discount vectors. Without it, even
ǫ-optimal policies need not exist and all the machinery will break down.
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3. The use of discrete time greatly reduced the complexity of the analysis. Given
a sufficiently general model, the set of continuous environments should contain
all discrete environments. For this reason the proof of Theorem 13 should go
through essentially unmodified. The same may not be true for Theorems 15
and 18. The former may be fixable with substantial effort (and perhaps should
be true intuitively). The latter has been partially addressed, with a positive
result in [Gol80, PY73, Pol68, Str55].
References
[FOO02] Shane Frederick, George L. Oewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue. Time discounting
and time preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2),
2002.
[Fud83] Drew Fudenberg. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite-horizon games.
Journal of Economic Theory, 31(2), 1983.
[GFM94] Leonard Green, Nathanael Fristoe, and Joel Myerson. Temporal discounting and
preference reversals in choice between delayed outcomes. Psychonomic bulletin
and review, 1(3):383–389, 1994.
[Gol80] Steven M. Goldman. Consistent plans. The Review of Economic Studies,
47(3):pp. 533–537, 1980.
[Hut04] Marcus Hutter. Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions based on
Algorithmic Probability. Springer, Berlin, 2004.
[Hut06] Marcus Hutter. General discounting versus average reward. In Proc. 17th Inter-
national Conf. on Algorithmic Learning Theory (ALT’06), volume 4264 of LNAI,
pages 244–258, Barcelona, 2006. Springer, Berlin.
[Leg08] Shane Legg. Machine Super Intelligence. PhD thesis, University of Lugano, 2008.
[LH07] Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter. Universal intelligence: A definition of machine
intelligence. Minds & Machines, 17(4):391–444, 2007.
[OR94] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT
Press, 1994.
[Pol68] Robert A. Pollak. Consistent planning. The Review of Economic Studies,
35(2):pp. 201–208, 1968.
[PY73] Bezalel Peleg and Menahem E. Yaari. On the existence of a consistent course
of action when tastes are changing. The Review of Economic Studies, 40(3):pp.
391–401, 1973.
[Sam37] Paul A. Samuelson. A note on measurement of utility. The Review of Economic
Studies, 4(2):pp. 155–161, 1937.
[Str55] Robert H. Strotz. Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization.
The Review of Economic Studies, 23(3):165–180, 1955.
[Tha81] Richard Thaler. Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics
Letters, 8(3):201 – 207, 1981.
15
A Technical Proofs
Before the proof of Theorem 8 we require a definition and two lemmas.
Definition 22. Let Π = AS be the set of all policies and define a metric D
on Π by T (π1, π2) := mint∈N {t : ∃h<t s.t π1(h<t) 6= π2(h<t)} or ∞ if π1 = π2 and
D(π1, π2) := exp(−T (π1, π2)).
T is the time-step at which π1 and π2 first differ. Now augment Π with the
topology induced by the metric d.
Lemma 23. Π is compact.
Proof. We proceed by showing Π is totally bounded and complete. Let ǫ = exp(−t)
and define an equivalence relation by π ∼ π′ if and only if T (π1, π2) ≥ t. If π ∼ π
′
then D(π, π′) ≤ ǫ. Note that Π/∼ is finite. Now choose a representative from each
class to create a finite set Π¯. Now
⋃
π∈Π¯Bǫ(π) = Π, where Bǫ(π) is the ball of radius
ǫ about π. Therefore Π is totally bounded.
Next, to show Π is complete. Let π1, π2, · · · be a Cauchy sequence with
D(πi, πi+j) < exp(−i) for all j > 0. Therefore πi(h<k) = πi+j(h<k)∀h<k with
k ≤ i, by the definition of D. Now define π by π(h<t) := πt(h<t) and note that
πi(h<j) = π(h<j)∀j ≤ i since πi(h<k) = πk(h<k) ≡ π(h<k) for k ≤ i. Therefore
limi→∞ πi = π and so Π is complete. Finally, Π is compact by the Heine-Borel
theorem.
Lemma 24. When viewed as a function from Π to R, V π
d
k(·) is continuous. (given
Assumption 7)
Proof. Suppose D(π1, π2) < exp(−t) then π1 and π2 are identical on all histories up
to length t. Therefore
|V π1
d
k (h<k)− V
π2
d
k (h<k)| ≤ d
k · [Rπ1(h<k) +R
π2(h<k)]
=
∞∑
i=k
dki (R
π1(h<k)i +R
π2
i (h<k)i) . (11)
Since π1 and π2 are identical up to time t, (11) becomes
∞∑
i=t
dki (R
π1(h<k)i +R
π2
i (h<k)i) =
∑
h<t
[
P (h<t|h<k, π1)V
π1
d
k (h<t) + P (h<t|h<k, π2)V
π2
d
k (h<t)|
]
(12)
where (12) follows from the definition of the reward and value functions. By As-
sumption 7, limt→∞
∑
h<t
P (h<t|h<k, πi)V
πi
d
k (h<t) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and so, V is
continuous.
Proof of Theorem 8. Let Π be the space of all policies with the metric of Def-
inition 22. By Lemmas 23/24 Π is compact and V is continuous. Therefore
argmaxπ V
π
d
k(h<1) exists by the extreme value theorem.
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B Table of Notation
Symbol Description
d Discount Matrix
d
k Discount Vector k
dkt The tth component of discount vector d
k (at time k reward rt is discounted
by dkt )
k, t Indices. k usually referring to a discount vector used at fixed time k, t
usually a time index for states.
i Summing index
ǫ, δ Small real numbers greater than zero
π, π′, πi Policies
Π The space of all policies
A,S,O,R Action, state, reward and observation spaces
R(s, a) The reward given when taking action a in state s
P (s′|s, a) The probability of transitioning to state s′ from state s having taken action
a
N,R The natural and real numbers respectively
St The set of all states reachable at time-step t
S<t The set of all states reachable up to time-step t
Bǫ(·) A ball of radius ǫ
R
π(h<t) The expected reward sequence when following π from state h<t
π∗
d
k The optimal policy when using discount vector d
k
πd The mixed policy using discount matrix d
π∗
d
The sub-game equilibrium policy using discount matrix d
R
∗
d
k(h<t) The expected reward sequence when following the optimal policy π
∗
d
k
V ∗
d
k(h<t) The value of the optimal policy π
∗
d
k
γ Discount rate for geometric discounting
αk A real valued scaling factor on a discount vector
κ Discount rate for hyperbolic discounting
h Horizon for constant depth discounting
m Lifespan for fixed lifetime discounting
s, h<t, h
′
<t States in a Markov decision process
D(π1, π2) The distance between policies π1 and π2 using the metric of Definition 22
D(dk,dj) The distance measure between discount vectors dk and dj as defined by
Definition 14
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